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SUMMARY
Evacuation areas are defined for those transportation accidents where
volatile chemical propellant tanks are exposed to fire in the wreckage and
eventually explode with consequent risks from fragments in surrounding
populated areas. An evacuation area with a minimum radius of 600 m
(2000 ft) is recommended to limit the statistical probability of fatality to
one in 100 such accidents. The result of this study was made possible by
the derivation of a distribution function of distances reached by fragments
from bursting chemical car tanks. Data concerning fragments was
obtained from reports of tank car pressure bursts between 1958 and 1971.
INTRODUCTION
Between 1958 and July 1, 1971, there were 98 railway accidents that
involved spills of flammable liquid chemicals with high vapor pressure at
ambient conditions (ref. 1). Of these accidents, 44 involved explosions of
84 chemical car tanks. In many of these accidents, train derailment
caused puncture of chemical car tanks, spillage and ignition of thier vola-
tile contents, and eventual pressure rupture of other upset tanks exposed
to the fire in the wreckage. Fragments from such accidents, mostly large
portions of tanks, were thrown or rocketed hundreds of meters and their
impact in surrounding communities often caused casualties and extensive
property damage. The frequency and severity of such accidents peaked in
1969 when 33 chemical car tanks exploded in 12 derailments.
The catastrophic proportions of these accidents, especially in 1969,
became a subject of concern to many organizations within government
and industry and as a result several studies have been underway to find
means by which their severity might be decreased. One such study by
the Association of American Railroads (AAR) proposes various concepts
by which the likelihood of tank puncture and fragment rocketing might be
decreased.
Another study by the Naval Ordnance Laboratory (NOL), sponsored by
AAR? is investigating thermal insulating materials and applications that
might increase tank exposure time to fire before rupture (ret, 2). Even if
the results of these studies prove the proposed design concepts feasible,
a considerable lead time would be required to modify a great number of
tank cars in the railroad inventory.
Railroad companies also have been working to prevent spills by im-
proving equipment, track and train operations. In addition, they have
developed emergency action plans for handling hazardous material incidents
(ref. 3). These efforts may have helped reduce such accidents, yet spills,
fire and explosions continue as more ton-miles of volatile chemicals are
logged each year.
In the majority of train accidents that involved explosions,, tanks con-
tained either LPG or liquid propane. This suggests that similar cata-
stophic results would be expected in derailments which involve bulk quantity
shipments of volatile chemical propellants such as liquid hydrogen, liquid
methane, anhydrous ammonia and ethylene oxide. Thus, the consequent
risk to the public also becomes a subject of concern to those government
agencies which ship or have consigned to them these types of chemical
propellants.
Documented data from such accidents that occurred between 1958 and
1971 show that tanks exploded from 3 min to 48 hr after their exposure to
fire. Therefore, it appears that in many cases there is enough time to make
evacuation of adjacent populated areas a feasible procedure as the fires are
being controlled and exposed tanks are being cooled to forestall their pres-
sure rupture. Rocketing could be considerably reduced by a structural
provision that would maintain a physical tie between two large parts of a
tank that would be formed by any circumferencial rupture of the shell.
Such provision on future tank cars would decrease the required areas of
evacuation. Improved thermal insulation would increase tank exposure
time to fire making evacuation feasible for the majority of these accidents
in the future.
At the present time, there is little, if any, quantitative information
available to local emergency forces at the scene of such accidents that
would help them evacuate reasonable areas consistent with an acceptable
risk to people from the impact of fragments (ref. 4, pp. 38 to 40). As a
consequence, fire fighters in some cases may be exposed to extreme
hazards at hose stream distances for longer periods than should be neces-
sary while larger-than-required areas are being evacuated; conversely, a
smaller-than-required evacuation area would result in higher-than-
acceptable risk in adjacent communities.
In order to determine an acceptable level of risk to people at various
distances from these bursting chemical car tanks, it was necessary to
study fragment sizes and distributions,, From the results of these studies
and assumptions concerning the number of people per unit-area exposed to
these fragments, conclusions were drawn as to a reasonable radius of an
evacuation area that would limit the statistical probability of fatality to one
per 100 such accidents. This limit is considered reasonable since accidents
of this kind have occurred on the average of 3 per year for the past several
years with a peak of 12 in 1969.
Guidelines for evacuation areas developed on such a basis in this study,
are recommended to the Joint Army, Navy, NASA, Air Force (JANNAF)
Safety and Environmental Protection Group for their proposed Propellant
Spill Cards, which describe emergency procedures. The intended wide
distribution of these cards to municipal fire and police departments should
help them establish proper and reasonable evacuation areas for those
transportation accidents where volatile chemical propellant containers are
exposed to fire. Evacuation areas for toxic propellant spills based on Ref. 5
have already been included on these cards,,
It should be emphasized that this guideline applies to hazards from
fragments only. It does not apply to that small fraction of accidents
where a rapid release of volatile, flammable chemical forms a huge plume
of fuel-air mixture, when later ignited, burns with extraordinary speed
forming strong and damaging pressure waves (ref, 6). Current studies
of fuel-air explosions and their effects may indicate a course of action
to prevent ignition sources and facilitate evacuation of people from hazards,
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
Data from accident reports (ref. 1) as summarized in Fig. 1, show
that 64 fragments impacted and came to rest at distances ranging from
tens of meters to 1500 m (4900 ft) from the origin. Although a total of
84 tanks exploded, apparently not all of the fragments were forcibly pro-
pelled and there is evidence that some impacted within the wreckage of
the train. Of the 64 fragments that did leave the scene, 50 percent came
to rest beyond a distance of 150 m (490 ft) and 20 percent were found
beyond 300 m (980 ft)0 As to size of these fragments, 20 percent were
classified as small and the majority of these were found to be within a
distance of 150 m (500 ft). Only four small pieces traveled beyond this
distance. This implies that if there were sufficient time to evacuate people
from an area with a 500 ft radius, the primary hazard would be from the
impact of large portions of tank rather than from the shrapnel affect of
small high velocity pieces. Of the total fragments, 50 ranged in size from
tank ends to 4/5 of a tank. The predominance of large pieces seems to be
typical of these container pressure bursts,
APPROACH TO ASSESSMENT OF RISK FROM FRAGMENTS
The approach taken to arrive at some estimate of risk to people from
fragments of exploding tanks is based on the statistical probability of their
being within the impact areas. Thus, it is desirable to find the best fit of
data on distances reached by fragments (ref. 1) to some equation represent -
ing a distribution function. Once the distribution function is derived it can be
used with assumptions concerning the number of people per unit area
exposed to the average fragment impact area to predict risks. Assuming
that all people within the impact area are killed, the statistical probability
of fatality per accident is expressed as a function of an established radius
of an evacuation area as given in Eq. (1):
P = PEFAAF [l - <p(R)] (1)
where
Pg = number of people per unit area exposed to fragments
^A = avera§e number of fragments per accident
AF = average impact area per fragment
<p(R) = distribution function of fragments within radius R
Distribution Function of Distances Reached by Fragments
Fragment data from Fig. 1, as plotted on probability paper (fig. 2),
shows good confidence in the log normal form of distribution as a function
of frament travel distances where the mean of the natural log arithm of
the radius, ju. = 6.16 and the standard deviation of the natural log arithm
of the radius a = 1.00. The distribution function of distances reached by
tank car fragments, (p(R), as derived from Fig. 2, is shown in Eq. (2):
•/c/nVR _ -,exp|- i(lnR - 5.16)2 dR (2)^ J
Estimate of Fragment Impact Areas
The behavior of large portions of tank upon their impact is difficult to
predict. In Crescent City, Illinois, the explosion of a tank car (SOEX 3252)
occurred 2-1/2 hr after its exposure to the fire in the wreck. A 30 ft long
section of tank rocketed striking the roof of a two story building 100 m away
and flew 230 m before impacting the ground. After the initial impact
with the ground, it apparently skipped and traveled another 290 m before
it came to rest at a total distance of 520 m (1600 ft) from the scene of the
explosion. The launch angle was estimated to be approximately 11 degrees
(ref. 7). Other fragments such as tub sections less than 20 ft in length
or larger portions with attached trucks have a tendency to tumble in flight
with relatively high aerodynamic drag. If fragments of this type have
small launch angles, they may travel over relatively shorter distances
with considerable tumbling subsequent to their impact. Without the
quantitative data that would allow a realistic estimate of these fragment
impact areas caused by skipping and tumbling, it becomes necessary to
make some arbitrary assumptions. The conservative assumptions made
were as follows:
(a) An intact tank is 60 ft long by 9 ft in diam
(b) Tank ends (fig, 1) were grouped with 1/4 tank portions
(c) The average length, L, of the 51 large portions of tank were
determined and multiplied by the 9 ft diam
(d) The average length times the diameter or the effective imprint
area of the large fragments were also applied to the 13 small
pieces
(e) All fragments leave the scene of the tank explosion at small angles
to the ground surface, resulting in one skip, an impact and a slide
distance equal to the average length of tank before they come to
rest
On the basis of these rather conservative assumptions, the averaged
impact area per fragment AF was estimated to be 3[l8.4 x 9] or 498 ft
(47.5 m2).
The average number of fragments per accident is 1.5. Therefore,p
the impact area of fragments per accident = 1 . 5 x 4 7 . 5 = 71.5m .
Estimate of Number of People per Unit Area
Exposed to Fragment Impact Area
Although one might assume that the highest number of derailments
which involve spillage of hazardous materials occurs at high speed, such
is not the case according to Ref. 1. Thus, the explosion of chemical
car tanks could occur in switching and humping operatings in close prox-
imity to highly populated areas as well as on main lines in sparsely
populated areas.
A survey of world population densities, Ref. 8, divides the earth's
surface into 740 equal area cells. Fourteen of these cells cover the
United States and the highest populated cell was found to be the Northern
o
portion of the Eastern Seaboard with a density of 166 peopleAm - Tnis
cell population density, p , was used as an average rural/urban popula-
L»
tion density in arriving at the estimated probability of fatality from
fragments of bursting chemical car tanks. However, as is the case with
most spectacular accidents, curiosity causes a considerable number of
people to gather at the perimeter of the evacuated area for such accidents.
Thus, the number of people gathered at the perimeter is taken into account
to predict the probability of fatality from fragment impacts.
Figure 3 describes the populated areas surrounding a train derailment
with an established evaluation area. Using Fig. 3, the following assump-
tions are made concerning population densities that are exposed to the total
fragment impact per accident, 71.5 m :
(a) All evacuated people gather in the perimeter area.
p(b) A percentage of the cell population density, 166. 5 peopleAm in
the outlying area with a radius of R = 5000 m are attracted to the perimeter
area.
(c) The perimeter area is occupied by evacuated people and attracted2
people to a crowd density pA of one person/10 m .
(d) The decrease of the population density in outlying areas by the
number of people attracted to the perimeter area is neglected.
8DEFINITION OF REQUIRED EVACUATION AREA
Probability of Fatality Versus Radii of Evacuation Areas
The overall probability of fatality from fragments of bursting chemical
car tanks would be strongly influenced by the number of people gathered at
the perimeter of an established evacuation area. Thus, it is necessary
to define the size of the perimeter area in terms of an incremental distance
AR so that the distribution of fragment impacts in this area of high popu-
lation density is taken into consideration. Based on the somewhat arbitrary
assumptions concerning population density exposed to these fragments, the
width of the perimeter area AR is expressed in Eq. (4),
• iXX —
-R (4)
where
z = fraction of the cell population density, p , attracted from the out-
lying areas to the perimeter area
R = radius from the site of the accident to the extremity of the out-
lying area, 5000 m
R = radius of the established evacuation area
The overall probability of fatality from fragment impacts in the perim-
eter area where the crowd is gathered and the areas beyond can now be
expressed in terms of radii of evacuation areas as given in Eq. (5).
p - p j . p _pp /c \
*0 ~ ^AR + *R+AR ^AR^R+AR W
where P^ = PAFAAF [[l - <p(R)J - (l - <p(R + AR))J is the probability
of fatality within the perimeter area and PR .^ = p F.A-p
is the probability of fatality in the outlying area beyond the perimeter
area.
With the use of Eq. (5), a family of curves was developed showing the
o/verall probability of fatality from fragment impacts per accident versus
radii of evaluation areas for fractions of the cell population density, zp ,
\s
attracted to the perimeter (fig, 4). It is obvious from this plot that for a
given radius of an evacuation area the overall probability of fatality, P ,
increases with increasing fractions of cell population density, p , attracted
Vx
to the perimeter.
Choice of Suitable Limit on Probability of Fatality
In the past 30 years, the railroads have experienced a fatality rate of
1,1 persons/yr from accidents involving hazardous materials and during
that time period millions of tons of hazardous materials were shipped each
year. During the 1960vs the fatality rate from spills of hazardous materials
was 101 persons/yr even with the spectacular tank car explosions in 1968
and 1969 (ref, 3), These explosion-type accidents have averaged about
4/yr from 1958 through July 1, 1971. On the basis of these statistics, it
would appear that a limit of one fatality per 100 such accidents would cause
fatalities due to this type of accident to be minor in comparison with all
fatalities due to hazardous materials. It can be seen from Fig. 4 that using
the 1/100 limit would mean that some radius of an evacuation area from
300 m (980 ft) to 800 m (2600 ft) would be required depending on the fraction
of the population density attracted to the scene of the accident. Areas of
evacuation for the 1/100 limit are considered small enough to make evacua-
tion a feasibly procedure within the first 60 min after the accident.
Recommended Evacuation Area and Procedure
Experience has shown that spectacular accidents attract crowds of
such numbers that it is difficult to bring in additional emergency equipment.
In discussions with local fire and police officials, they indicate a wide range
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of estimates concerning the numbers of people that have gathered in such
accidents within the first 60 min. Conclusions were drawn from these
discussions that from 10 to 40 percent of the surrounding population den-
sity, p would be attracted while an evacuation area is being established.
Accordingly, it was decided to accept a certain degree of uncertainty
in the probability of fatality for the initial evacuation area. On this basis,
a 600 m radius (approximately 2000 ft) was chosen where the probability of
fatality from fragment impact would range from 8/1000 to 2/100 accidents.
After the initial evacuation area is established, an estimate of crowd size
should be made for possible increases in the area to hold the probability of
fatality limit to 1/100 such accidents as shown in Fig. 5 and summarized
in table I.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
For those transportation accidents in which tanks of volatile chemicals
are exposed to fire, an initial minimum radius of an evacuation area of
600 m (2000 ft) should be established as quickly as possible to limit the
probability of fatality from the impact of large tank fragments to 1/100 such
accidents,, This limit is thought to be reasonable based on the frequency
of these accidents over the past 13 yrs. The initial evacuation area should
be subsequently increased, if necessary, depending on the estimated number
of spectators gathered at its perimeter.
Even though it was possible to derive the distribution function for
distances traveled by fragments for accidents involving pressure burst of
tanks, two sources of uncertainty were encountered which required the use
of rather arbitrary assumptions in order to predict probability of fatality
from the impact of tank fragments. The first source of uncertainty is the
behavior of these large fragments subsequent to their impact and consequetly
the estimated size of the total fragment impact areas. It is thought that
this problem was dealt with in a conservative manner by arbitrarily increas-
ing the average fragment impact area by a factor of three. This assump-
tion allows for skipping, sliding, and tumbling.
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The other problem is the estimated number of spectators that would
be expected to gather while a reasonable evacuation area is being estab-
lished. The factors which cause people to gather are not predictable;
however, based on conversations with emergency-service personnel, a
good guess is from 10 to 40 percent of the population density from 3 mi
away would be attracted to the scene of a spectacular accident. This
forces acceptance of some uncertainty in the probability of fatality for the
initially established evacuation area, which is recommended to have a
600 m (2000 ft) radius. However, once this area is established, an esti-
mate of crowd size on the perimeter would indicate additional increases
to the initial area to meet the desired probability limit of one fatality per
100 accidents.
More work is needed in both cases to reduce the uncertainty in
establishing evacuation area guidelines to protect people from the impact
of fragments caused by the pressure burst of chemical tanks. Perhaps
the most pressing need is to understand fragment trajectories and the
behavior of these fragments subsequent to their impact.
REFERENCES
1. Phillips, E.; and Olson, Lee: Summary of Ruptured Tank Cars Involved
in Past Accidents. Rep. RA-01-2-7, Phase 01 Rep., Assoc. Am.
Railroads, Chicago Res. Center, July 24, 1971.
2. Levine, D0; and Dancer, D. M.: Fire Protection of Railroad Tank
Cars Carrying Hazardous Materials - Analytical Calculations and Lab-
oratory Screening of Thermal Insulation Candidates. Rep. NOLTR-
72-142, Naval Ordnance Lab., July 21, 1972.
3. O'Driscoll, J. J.: Methods for Prevention of Spills in the Rail Trans-
portation of Hazardous Materials, Control of Hazardous Material
Spills„ Presented at the 1972 National Conference on Control of
Hazardous Material Spills, Houston, Tex., Mar. 21-23, 19720
12
4. Anon.: Railroad Accident Report. Derailment of Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company's Train 94 at Houston, Texas, October 19, 1971.
Rep. NTSB-RAR-72-6, National Transportation Safety Board,
Adopted Dec. 13, 1972.
50 Siewert, R, D.: A Method for Defining Down-Wind Evacuation Areas
for Transportation Accidents Involving Toxic Propellant Spills. NASA
TMX-68188, 1972.
6. Strehlow, R. A.: Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosions - An Overview.
Presented at Fourteenth Symposium (International) on Combustion,
Pennsylvania State Univ., University Park, Pa., Aug. 20-25, 1972.
7. Phillips, E.; and Olson, Lee: Analysis of Tank Car Rocketing in Acci-
dents. Rep. RA-12-2-23, Phase 12 Rep., Assoc. Am. Railroads,
Chicago Res, Center, Dec. 13, 1972.
8,, Anon.: Worldwide Environmental Summary: Part I, Demographic
Soils and Meteorological Data. USAEC Rep, SNS-NUS-932,
June 1972.
13
TABLE I. - PEOPLE AT PERIMETER VERSUS
REQUIRED RADII OF EVACUATION AREAS
FOR A PROBABILITY OF FATALITY LIMIT
OF ONE PERSON PER 100 ACCIDENTS
Radius of evacuation areas People gathered
at perimeter
m (ft, approx.)
400 (1300)
440 (1450)
520 (1700)
560 (1850)
a600 (1950)
640 (2100)
680 (2250)
720 (2375)
760 (2500)
800 (2625)
840 (2750)
880 (2850)
920 (2950)
500
750
1250
1550
1950
2400
3250
3900
4800
5900
7350
8500
9550
aMinimum radius of evacuation area
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Figure 2. 1 Density of fragments versus the log of distance R (distance in feet).
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(b) POPULATION DENSITIES.
Figure 3. - Populated areas and popufation density surrounding an
established evacuation area for accidents involving chemical car
tank bursts.
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